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INTRODUCTION
On the 17th of March 2008, the Chief Public Prosecutor's Office
(Yargitay Cumhuriyet Ba~savczhi) filed an indictment to the Turkish
Constitutional Court (Court) against the governing "Justice and
Development Party" (Adalet ve Kalkinma Partisi). The main allegation
concerned acts which were deemed to be in violation of the principle of
laicism, protected by the Turkish Constitution.' The Chief Prosecutor's
Office demanded that, in light of the evidence provided, the dissolution
of the Justice and Development Party by the Court under Article 101 of
Law No. 2820 on Political Parties; which above all stipulates that the
Court has competence to dissolve a political party in case "a political
party's regulatory statute or program is contrary to the independence of
the state, its indivisible integrity with its territory and nation, human
rights, the principles of equality and rule of law, sovereignty of the
1. For brief information on the affiliations of the Justice and Development Party
and Political Islam in Turkey, see, AYDIN Senem Aydin & C AKIR Ruben Cakir,
Political Islam in Turkey, CEPS Working Paper No. 265, April 2007, for brief
information on the affiliations of the Justice and Development Party and Political Islam
in Turkey. See also, Nililfer Narli, The Rise of the Islamist Movement in Turkey, in
REVOLUTIONARIES AND REFORMISTS: CONTEMPORARY ISLAMIST MOVEMENTS IN THE
MIDDLE EAST 125-40 (Barry Rubin ed., SUNY Press 2003).
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nation, the principles of the democratic and [laic]2 republic, they shall
not aim to [support] or establish [a social] class or group dictatorship
or dictatorship of any kind, nor shall they [promote the commission of
crime] or in cases the 'Court determines that the [political] party... has
become a centerfor. . .such act[s.] ,
3
Unsurprisingly, the news generated vast political debate both due to
the severe nature of the allegations and the genuine possibility of the
dissolution of a political party, which not only possessed a vast majority
within the Parliament but also had been in power since 2002.
Unfortunately, Turkish constitutional and political tradition offers
numerous examples of political party dissolutions, including instances
based partially or exclusively on allegations of "becomfing] the centre of
such act[s]" contrary to the principle of laicism.4 For example, on May
20, 1970, the National Order Party (Milli Nizam Partisi) was dissolved
by the Constitutional Court on the premises that it had "become [a
centeri of such act[s]. '5 On March 16, 1998 and on June 22, 2001, the
2. The Turkish text of the Constitution uses the Turkish term 'laik' (laic). Official
translations to English use the expression "secular" when used as an adjective. Taking
into consideration the differences between these expressions, we have preferred to use the
term "laic" in our translations of the Constitutional text so that normative confusion can
be avoided and the paper is overall conceptually consistent. The official English
translation of the Constitution can be found at the Turkish Constitutional Court's official
website, http://www.anayasa.gov.tr/images/loaded/pdf dosyalari/THE_
CONSTITUTION OF THE REPUBLICOFTURKEY.pdf.
3. TURK. CONST. art. 69. Article 69 of the Constitution provides the legal basis for
Article 101 of Law No. 2820, which was modified in 1995 with Law No. 4121 under
which the "becom[ing] a centre [oft" criteria was inserted, in order to make dissolution
more difficult. In 2001, Article 69 was further amended with Law No. 4709 which
brought an additional provision clarifying in detail the scope of the "becom[ing] a centre
[of]" criteria. Some writers believe that even though the criteria have been restricted to a
certain degree, in light of jurisprudence, the Court still has the possibility to interpret it
extensively. See GOZLER Kemal, Parti Kapatmanin Kriteri Ne? Parti Kapatmaya
Kari Anayasa Dekiikligi (7ziim mi? [What are the Criteria for Party Dissolution? Is a
Constitutional Amendment Against Party Dissolution the Solution?], 93 Tiirkiye
Giinlhii, Sayi 24-31, Bahar (2008). GOZLER proposes changing the composition of the
Court (putting emphasis on the parliament's discretion in the proposal of judges) in order
to moderate its stance towards political parties. See Id.
4. See Rapor, Siyasi Partilerin Kapattimasi Konusunda Ttirkiye ve Ban Ulkelerdeki
Yasal Diizenlemeler, TBMM Ara~tlrma Merkezi, Hukuk B61iimti, Mart 2008. [Report,
The Legal Regulation of the Dissolution of Political Parties in Turkey and in some
Countries, Turkish Grand National Assembly, Research Center, Legal Department,
March 2008]. The Constitutional Court has dissolved 25 political parties since its
establishment in 1961. See id. These dissolutions have been based on different rationales,
ranging from procedural deficiencies to separatist activities, including incitation to
violence. See id.
5. See Judgment of 20 May 1971, E: 1971/l(Parti kapanilmasi), K: 1971/1,
Anayasa Mahkemesi [Constitutional Court] (Turkey). All judgments of the Turkish
Constitutional Court are accessible at http://www.anayasa.gov.tr/. Texts are in Turkish.
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Welfare Party (Refah Partisi)6 and its extension, the Virtue Party (Fazilet
Partisi),7 were respectively dissolved on similar grounds. Thus, there
was no doubt that the Court could decide on the dissolution of the Justice
and Development Party if it saw fit, no matter its popularity. The Court
delivered its judgment on the 3 0 th of July 2008 in which it found that the
Party had in effect become a center of acts contrary to the principle of
laicism; yet unable to acquire the necessary qualified majority of votes,
ruled on the next adverse measure foreseen by law.8
One interesting point in the indictment was the allegation that the
adoption of Law No. 5735 on February 9, 2008, a constitutional
amendment proposed by the Justice and Development Party and
supported by the Nationalist Action Party (Milliyetqi Hareket Partisi),
constituted primary evidence towards the alleged anti-laic policies of the
Party. Law No. 5735 had been adopted amid intense political debate on
an existing prohibition on the use of the Islamic veil9 throughout higher
6. See Judgment of 16 January 1998, E: 1997/1 (Siyasi Parti Kapatma), K: 1998/1
(16 January 1998), Anayasa Mahkemesi [Constitutional Court] (Turkey). Deciding on
the issue, the European Court on Human Rights (ECHR) found that the dissolution of the
Welfare Party was not a violation of the European Convention on Human Rights
(EConHR). See Case of Refah Partisi and others v. Turkey, 2003-1I, App. Nos.
41340/98, 41342/98, 41343/98 & 41344/98, Eur. Ct. H.R. (2003).
7. See Judgment of 22 June 2001, E: 1992/2 (Siyasi Parti Kapatma), K: 2001/2,
Anayasa Mahkemesi [Constitutional Court] (Turkey). Similar to the Welfare Party, the
Virtue Party took its case to the ECHR, but at a later stage pulled back its application
alleging that the ECHR had proven itself to be prejudiced against "Muslim Communities"
as shown by its previous jurisprudence, specifically citing the Case of Refah Partisi and
others v. Turkey, Eur. Ct. H.R. (2003), and the Case of Leyla $ahin v. Turkey, 2005-XI,
App. No. 44774/98, Eur. Ct. H.R. (2005). See Affaire Fazilet Partisi et Kutan c. Turquie,
Arret (radiation), App. No. 1444/02, Eur. Ct. H.R. (2006) (text in French only).
8. See Judgment of 30 June 2008, E: 2008/1 (siyasi parti kapatma), K: 2008/2,
Anayasa Mahkemesi [Constitutional Court] (Turkey). Ten out of the eleven sitting
judges determined that the Party had in effect become a center of unconstitutional acts.
See id. On the measure to be taken, only six judges voted for the dissolution of the Party.
See id. Lacking one vote, the Court had to, under its regulations, rule on the next most
adverse measure against the Party, which in this case was its deprivation of state financial
aid. See id
9. There are numerous terms for the cover used by Muslim women to cover their
hair/head. Moreover, the style that the cover is used may vary between countries,
regions, traditions and sects. A shift in the use and connotations of specific terms also
vary during periods. For example in the 1990's in Turkey, the "Islamic headscarf'
(ba drtiisii) was seen by the laic section of the society as a symbol of regressive-rural
religious practice, while the "Turban" (turban) was considered urbanized and modem;
thus "tolerable" (The Council of Higher Education had deemed this second method
acceptable in higher education in a circular adopted in 1984, see infra Heading I/A).
However, today the meanings have shifted and the 'turban' is regularly affiliated with
political Islam and fundamentalist movements by the laic segments of society, while the
Islamic headscarf has come to be regarded as a more traditional, cultural or conservative
practice. In order to not enter into these debates, we have chosen to simply use the term
"Islamic veil" from which the reader should understand as any material used by a Muslim
female to cover partially or entirely her hair, head and/or neck in general, due to religious
[Vol. 28:3
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education establishments. The legislation foresaw the amendment of the
Constitution in order to nullify this restriction. Also known as the
"Turban Amendment" in public discourse, the legislation was adopted by
a large majority in Parliament (411/518 affirmative votes). Political
actors supporting the motion claimed that the law would bring an end to
the decades' long socio-political struggle surrounding the issue.
However, in accord with the main opposition party's objections against
the legislation, and citing its standing jurisprudence, the Court struck
down Law No. 5735 on June 5, 2008 for violating, first and foremost, the
principle of laicism. 10 The Court found that the aim of the amendment
was to make lawful the use of the Islamic veil in higher education in
direct violation of the Court's longstanding jurisprudence."
It was through a landmark judgment in 1989 that the Court had
declared the use of the Islamic veil in higher education irreconcilable
with the principle of laicism.1 2 The case concerned the constitutionality
of Law No. 3511, which foresaw the incorporation of Additional Article
16 into Law No. 2547 on Higher Education. The proposed article
stipulated the freedom to "cover the neck and hair with a veil or turban
for religious beliefs" in higher education establishments. 13  The
judgment of 1989 which annulled Law No. 3511 would bring a definitive
legal answer to the issue that had stirred conflict between various actors
in Turkish political life since the 1970's. It would also constitute the
basis of future judicial decisions on the issue, and would become the
main point of reference for higher education establishments willing to
take measures against those students who insisted on using the Islamic
veil during their higher education. Within this respect, the issue of the
use of the Islamic veil in higher education would naturally transform
within legal dialectics into a conflict between individual rights and
freedoms and the state as the regulator of their enjoyment.
At this point we can easily express that there is no shortage of
examples, both on a national and international level, which demonstrate
how often such significant conflicts arise due to the public manifestation
of religious symbols, especially if they are deemed to be expressively
convictions. Although we acknowledge that the variety of the cover used and the
difference in spiritual and social meanings are vast, with regards to the applied
prohibition in higher education in Turkey the measures taken against them remain the
same.
10. See Judgment of 5 June 2008, E: 2008/16, K: 2008/116, Anayasa Mahkemesi
[Constitutional Court] (Turkey).
11. See id.
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proselytizing. 14 In situations such as these, the interaction between the
right of the individual to enjoy the forum externum of the freedom of
religion and the right of a third party not to be exposed to abusive
proselytism is always further complicated with the inclusion of legal
concepts such as the states positive and negative obligations towards
guaranteeing the enjoyment of all rights and freedoms to the fullest
extent possible through the installment of a balance between conflicting
interests; while simultaneously ensuring the effective practice of state
neutrality and non-discrimination and refraining from disproportionate
and unnecessary interventions. Within this context and separated from
the surrounding political rhetoric, the prohibition on the use of the
Islamic veil in higher education and the socio-political and legal
difficulties that stem from it can be deduced to the difficulty of balancing
these individual rights whilst preserving state neutrality and public order.
Especially in the case of Turkey-a state which not only rejoices in the
fact that it is able to practice western liberal democracy, but also
emphasizes the dominant position of the principle of laicism for the
safeguard of this system15-this delicate balance is sometimes harder to
manage.
Within this general framework, this paper will be devoted to the
illustration of the fundamental position of the principle of laicism in
Turkish constitutional law, in particular with respect to the use of the
Islamic veil in higher education. It is our firm belief that the stalemate in
Turkey relative to the use of the Islamic veil in higher education provides
us an exceptional case study which will not only allow us to expose the
hermeneutics of the principle of laicism under Turkish constitutional law,
but will also enable us to surpass the realms of constitutional theory and
present the practical ramifications of the application of the principle,
both from a legal and political perspective. Furthermore, this inquiry is
also relevant since its socio-political impact for Turkey is an ongoing
issue. Likewise, for many western countries which have started to
experience similar issues, the debate is becoming increasingly vocal.'
6
14. One recent example of such a case concerns the status of crucifixes in
classrooms in Italy, in which the ECHR declared that the practice itself was in violation
of the EConHR, for the state was required to observe confessional neutrality, specifically
in the context of public education. See Case of Lautsi v. Italy, App. No. 30814/06, Eur.
Ct. H.R. (2009).
15. This point will be elaborated upon in detail. See infra Heading I/A and I/C.
16. Already a prohibition on the use of religious symbols which openly show
religious affiliation has been adopted within the context of secondary education in France
in 2004. See Law No. 2004-228 of March 15, 2004, Journal Officiel de la Rdpublique
Frangaise [J.O.] [Official Gazette of France] (Law No. 2004-228). In relation to the
question of immigration and the growing number of Muslim minority communities in
various western countries, the proposals made by various political actors on the adoption
of strict measures are more and more visible throughout European media. For example,
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In order to achieve a comprehensive study on the issue our approach
will comprise a two level analysis. Our first undertaking will consist of
framing the constitutional regulation of the principle of laicism within
Turkish law. This descriptive level will not solely consist of the positive
constitutional framework, but will also include its historical context as
well as its detailed elaboration by the Court. This regulatory framework
is a prerequisite of any discussion on the issue of the Islamic veil; for
without understanding the genuine focus put on the principle of laicism
within the Turkish legal construct it would be impossible to achieve a
true understanding of the fragility of the relationship between state and
religion. Building upon this normative framework, the second level of
our analysis will explore the complicated legal matrix regarding the
prohibition on the use on the Islamic veil in higher education and provide
insight into the dialectics concerning the present constitutional argument.
This will enable the reader to witness the use of legal interpretation as a
tool for the effective application of the principle of laicism under the
present Constitution. It will also provide further foresight vis-a-vis
potential future conflicts under the regulation of religion by the state in
Turkey.
Finally, we would also like to specifically remark that this brief
work does not have any ambition of providing an exhaustive account of
the numerous parameters which might be relevant for a possible solution
to the problem. Neither does it possess the aspiration of scrutinizing the
legitimacy of the current prohibition; detached of all political rhetoric,
such a task can be objectively achieved only if the social, economic and
psychological dimensions of the issue are meticulously put forth. Taking
on such an endeavor is an inspiration that unfortunately this brief work
cannot address. Within this perspective, this paper only seeks to offer a
modest contribution to comparative constitutional law studies on the
relation between state and religion through a detailed account of the
practice of Turkish laicism within the context of the Islamic veil.
Switzerland has become the first European country to take more radical measures when
confronted with this dilemma (the referendum on the 29 th of November 2009 concerning
banning the construction of Minarets for mosques in Switzerland). See Nick Cumming-
Bruce & Steve Erlanger, Swiss Ban Buidling of Minarets on Mosques, N.Y. TIMES, Nov.
30, 2009, at A6, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2009/ll/30/world/europe/
30swiss.html? r-l. However, we must express that the issue of the Islamic veil has
different socio-political consequences for Turkey, which perceives it as a socio-political
dilemma, and for European states that seem to perceive it rather as an identity issue. See
Gavin Hewitt, Europe's Identity Crisis, B.B.C. NEWS, Nov. 24, 2009,
http://www.bbc.co.uk/blogs/thereporters/gavinhewitt/2009/1 1/europes identitycrisis.ht
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1. THE NORMATIVE PROTECTION OF LAICISM IN TURKISH
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW
Although the dominant position of the principle of laicism within
the Turkish constitutional order has been debated ad nauseam by Turkish
constitutional literature, we still consider underlining the characteristics
of this principal, as well as its normative standing in Turkish legal
construct a crucial step for the demonstration of its concrete application.
The heavy presence of the principle, both in word and spirit, makes of it
one of the basic foundations of the republican state order and enables
Turkey to exercise to a large extent western liberal democracy. Despite
the alignment of their legal systems with western norms to a certain
degree; within the countries which possess a majority Muslim population
Turkey with its laic political order based on European legal values and
norms still stands unique in comparison.17 It is for this reason that the
principle has been strongly present and protected within the Turkish
constitutional order; and albeit numerous amendments to the
constitutional text, it has never been open to direct debate.
As Oktem clearly puts it: "the principle of laicism appears to be
one of the most important kemalist principles18 because it makes out of
17. See Uygun Oktay, Avrupa ve Tirk Anayasast: Temel ilkeler Yniinden Genel bir
Degerlendirme [Europe and the Turkish Constitution: General Evaluation of the
Fundamental Principles], 22 PUBLICATION OF THE CONSTITUTIONAL COURT, 377-387
(2005) (Turk.) for a detailed comparison. As Uygun correctly points out, harmonization
of constitutional and penal law principles have taken place between the west and
"Muslim countries" to a certain degree, but Turkey is the sole example possessing both a
laic constitution and civil code. See id. On the other side, it is hard to deny that some
effective regulations and practices in Turkey cannot be reconciled with an isolated
understanding of laicism, but must also take into account the political developments
within the country and region. For example, it is difficult to envisage perfect conformity
between laicism and the existence of the Turkish State Religious Affairs Directorate (T C.
Diyanet i4leri Ba~kanli i), which is a constitutional organ under the executive branch
functioning according to the official Sunnite doctrines and compromising more than
80.000 employees, including Imam 's, which are all state employed. See also Oktem A.
Emre & Uzun Mehmet C., National Report on the Relation between State and Religion,
Report submitted to the XVIIPh International Congress of Comparative Law,
International Academy of Comparative Law and The American Society of Comparative
Law (Turk.) (forthcoming July 25-Aug. 1, 2010) for an overview of the current situation
on the relation between state and religion.
18. Various expressions in Turkish legal practice such as "Kemalist Principles" and
"Reforms and Modernism of Atatitrk" refer to the major revolutionary reforms adopted
during the foundation of the Turkish Republic under the vision of its founding father,
Mustafa Kemal Atattirk. Within this context, during the Turkish war of national
liberation and after the formation of the Turkish Republic out of the ashes of the
disintegrated Ottoman Empire, revolutionary measures were taken by the government
headed by Mustafa Kemal Atattirk in order to ascertain the success of the new nation
state. Laicism is one of these principles and its historical context will be briefly dealt
with infra. Others include major principles such as republicanism, nationalism,
modernism, rationalism, national sovereignty, gender equality etc. These principals have
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Turkey the only Muslim country genuinely laic ... beyond a simple
separation of the religious sphere from the temporal sphere, the Turkish
laicism carries a very important mission. "19 For Yiizba~ioglu the
mission of "the principle of laicism and kemalist principles and reforms
which constitute the means of its application within the society, is to
implement in Turkey in a very short amount of time, the processes of
Renaissance and Enlightenment of the West and to achieve the level of
contemporary civilization thanks to the new form of the laic society.
Thus, the principle of laicism sets out for Turkey a social dimension
which is more important than its legal dimension which constitutes its
infrastructure. 20
The pertinence of this social dimension has been further elevated by
the Turkish constitutional judge, whom while fulfilling the task of
clarifying the scope of the principle has gone beyond the normative
framework and has afforded the principle an existential importance for
the Republic under a teleological and historical approach.2' Specifically
the historical context has inclined the Turkish judiciary in general to
formulate a strict interpretation and rigid application of the principle.
Interesting to observe, this approach has not only become a focal point
for the Turkish constitutional judge, but has also formed an important
anchor for his European counterpart, as witnessed in the jurisprudence of
the European Court of Human Rights (ECHR) in the Case of Refah
Partisi and Others v. Turkey22 and the Case of Leyla 5ahin v. Turkey. 3
To this respect, an overview of the constitutional development of laicism
in Turkey is a sine qua non before any illustration of its normative and
interpretative aspects. It will thus be possible to understand both the
multi-layered mechanisms that are currently in place protecting its form
been concretized through numerous statutes, also known as "Reform Laws." These
statutes range from the adoption of the Latin alphabet and Roman numerals, to the
abolishment of certain feudal and religious titles and insignia. The process undertaken by
the adoption of these measures which aimed modernizing in great haste a society ruled
under religious and feudal tenets is also called the "Turkish Revolution" within Turkish
history. See generally LORD PATRICK KINROSS, ATATURK: THE REBIRTH OF A NATION,
(Weidenfeld & Nicolson 1966) for a historical account of the foundation of the republic.
19. See Oktem A. Emre, La Sp~cificit6 de la Laicit Turque, 29 ISLAMOCHRISTIANA
(PONTIFICAL INSTITUTE FOR ARABIC AND ISLAMIC STUDIES) [P.I.S.A.I] 93-94 (2003)
(Turk.).
20. See Ydizba~ioglu Necmi, Tirk Anayasa Yargisinda Anayasallik Bloku [The
Constitutional Block in Turkish Constitutional Jurisdiction], 3762 istanbul Oniversitesi
Yaymlan, [ISTANBUL U. PUBLICATIONS] 170 (1993) (Turk.).
21. See discussion infra Part I.C.
22. See generally Case of Refah Partisi and Others v. Turkey, [GC] App. Nos.
41340/98, 41342/98, 41343/98 and 41344/98 Eur. Ct. H.R. (2003).
23. See generally Case of Leyla $ahin v. Turkey, Grand Chamber, [GC] App. No.
44774/98 Eur. Ct. H.R. (2005).
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and essence, and the substantive jurisprudential protection provided by
the Turkish constitutional judge.
A. The Historical Context of Laicism in Turkish Constitutional Law
The source of the principle of laicism in Turkish constitutional law
can be found in the doctrine of "la!'cisme" adopted from French
constitutional tradition. Unlike secularism which essentially focuses on
issues concerning the status of clergy and church and the religious
indifference of the state institution, 4 the Turkish perspective, similar to
its French origins, concentrates on the withdrawal of the religious
spheres influence from political and public life; and its foremost
exclusion from the educational and instructional spheres.25 Yet, during
its historical development in Turkish legal practice, it has also differed to
a large extent from its French origins, achieving its own very particular
conception. 26 This sui generis conception of laicism 27 was primarily due
to the necessity of the newly independent Turkish state to modernize in
revolutionary haste. It was furthermore promoted by Turkish legal
activism, which since its initial formation in the first quarter of the 2 0 t
h
Century has "tried to transform the social, political, ideological,
religious and economic systems it encountered'2 8 with the aim of
meeting the requirements of socio-political change necessary for the
sustained existence of the modern Turkish nation state; thus guaranteeing
non-regression to the theocratic imperial model of governance witnessed
under the Ottoman Empire.
Essentially, the background constitutional movement for the
laicization of the State can be traced back to the Tanzimat period
(administrative reforms era of 1839); a period in which intensifying
pressures from European States in conjunction with the profound
24. See Elisabeth Zoller, Les Rapports Entre Les Eglises et Les Etats aux Etats Unis:
Le Modele Americain de Pluralisme Religieux Egalitaire [The Relationship between
Church and State in the United States: the American Model of Religious Pluralism
Egalitarian in Secularism], in LAIcITE, LIBERTE DE RELIGION ET CONVENTION
EUROPEENNE DES DROITS DE L'HOMME [FREEDOM OF RELIGION & EUR. CONVENTION ON
HUM. RTS.] 15-16 (Gerald Gonzalez ed. 2006) (Belg.).
25. See TanOr Btilent & Yuzba~ioglu Necmi, 1982 Anayasasina Gdre Tfirk Anayasa
Hukuku-2004 Dekiikliklerine Gdre [Turkish Constitutional Law according to the
Constitution of 1982-According to the 2004 Amendments], 6 BASKI, BETA 76-79
(2004) (Turk.).
26. Unlike in France where laicism has forced the institutions of "State" and
"Religion" to be rigorously separated, the Turkish system has construed a model in which
the State has an important role in regulating religious affairs. Id at 77. See also supra
note 16.
27. See Oktem, supra note 19.
28. Oriicii Esin, Judicial Navigation as Official Law Meets Culture in Turkey, 41
INT'L J. L. IN CONTEXT 40 (2008).
[Vol. 28:3
THE PROTECTION OF LAICSM IN TURKEY
influence of western enlightenment and human rights doctrines29 resulted
with the adoption of legal reforms by the Ottoman Empire. These
reforms predominantly aimed the establishment of certain western
principles within the Empire's legal order and included the embracement
of legal concepts such as the equality before law. These legal reforms
also brought into existence concrete policies of institutional
westernization, such as the formation of the Nizamiye Courts limiting the
jurisdiction of the $er'iye Courts,3° the establishment of modem
education institutions besides traditional Medrasah 's3' and the adoption
of the new civil code, the Mecelle (Codex) in 1877.32 These institutional
reforms came to a pause with the eruption of the First World War, after
which the National Liberation Government in Ankara established the
Turkish National Assembly in 1920. With the adoption of the first
Constitution on January 20, 192 133 the modern Turkish nation-state was
born under a constitutional system according to which sovereignty
resided within the Nation (Article 3, Constitution of 1921). This was a
clear-cut separation from the legal and philosophical foundations of the
Ottoman Empire. While initially Islam continued to be reserved as the
official state religion, the complete laicization process of the state had
irreversibly begun. The governing ideology recognized that only through
the adoption of principles such as laicism and republicanism could the
state rupture the legal, historical and psychological barriers that might
still bind it to the Empire, which was now considered defacto dead.
29. Timur Taner, Osmanli Deviet Diizeni [Ottoman State Order] s.101-102 (1979)
(Turk.) (cited in Dingkol (Vural) Bihterin, 1982 Anayasasi 1 erqevesinde ve Anayasa
Mahkemesi Kararlannda Laiklik [Laicism within the Framework of the 1982
Constitution and in the Constitutional Court's Judgments] Kazancl 28 (1992) (Turk.)).
30. Id. at 29. Unlike the $er'iye Courts, which exclusively applied Islamic law, the
Nizamiye Courts were hybrid. It was foreseen that these Courts would look at a wide
array of disputes in such cases as those that non-Muslims were involved or those in
which complicated conflicts arose between different legal systems and principles
(especially with regards to international trade or transposed legislation from Europe).
31. See Sayar Nihad S., Tiirkiye imparatorluk Dbnemi, Siyasi, Askeri, idari ve Mali
Olaylan [Turkish Imperial Era, Political, Military, Administrative and Financial
Developments], 2. BASKI, ITIA 182 (1978).
32. The Mecelle was in force until 1926, at which time it was replaced by the new
Turkish Civil Code, a western model code based on the Swiss Civil Code. The Mecelle
was hybrid in the sense that it maintained its Islamic law foundation, yet it incorporated
certain western legal notions in order to better regulate complicated legal issues.
33. The Constitution of 1921 must essentially be seen as a transitional Constitution,
adopted during foreign occupation and construed as a typical incarnation of the concept
of fusion of powers, due to the needs of a centralized national liberation government.
The principle of separation of powers was later adopted through the Constitution of 1961.
For brief information on the political system put in place by the first Constitution of
Turkey. See Ozbudun Ergun, Tiirk Anayasa Hukuku [Turkish Constitutional Law], 8.
Baski, Yetkin 27-30 (2004).
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In order to comb out any risk of political regression towards the
Empire, the government adopted progressive revolutionary steps. First
of all, Decision No. 307 and Decision No. 308 were adopted in 1922
abolishing the Sultanate and de jure terminating the Ottoman Empire in
order to ascertain the legal situation. However, the abolishment of the
Caliphate would have to wait for one more year, until the required moral
and social grounds for such a radical social derogation could be achieved
while still under ongoing foreign occupation. This measure was
undertaken through Law No. 431 adopted on March 3, 1924 abolishing
the Caliphate and the Ministry on Religion and Religious Foundations.
In addition Law No. 430 on the Unification of the Educational System
terminated the religious-laic duality within the education system to the
benefit of the latter. Approximately a month later, on April 8, 1924, the
unification of the judiciary was likewise established.34 Thus, the state
had taken measures in order to both socially and legally laicize itself and
the society.
Although the Second Constitution of Turkey of April 20, 1924
continued to embrace Islam as the official State religion, it did include
under Article 80 the freedom of conscience for all individuals. Further
reforms for the laicization of state and society included such examples as
the adoption of the Law on the Closure of Dervish Monasteries and
Tombs, the Abolition of the Office of Keeper of Tombs and the
Abolition and Prohibition of Certain Titles on November 30, 1925, 35 the
Law on the Wearing of Hats on November 28, 1925 and the adoption of
the Turkish Civil Code, The Commercial Code and Criminal Code in
1926.36 Specifically in the context of the new laic Civil Code, emphasis
was added on gender equality. This was done in order to elevate the
standards of equality between men and women to a greater extent in a
society which had been ruled under the dictates of religious law for
centuries. A vast number of measures were also adopted to bridge the
gap between males and females, bringing provisions for their protection
and the empowerment of the latter. For instance, the right to vote in
municipal elections was recognized for women in 1930 and the right for
women to vote and stand for office in national elections was recognized
as early as 1934.37
34. See Dingkol, supra note 29, at 34.
35. These titles include religious and feudal titles; a step taken in order to further
develop the understanding of equality of citizens within the new nation state.
36. Most of these laws, known as the "Reform Laws," are protected under Article
174 of the Constitution of 1982. See also supra note 18.
37. In elections held on the 8 h of February 1935, 17 Turkish women were elected in
to the National Assembly for the first time.
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With an amendment in 1928, reference to the state religion was
removed altogether from the text of the Constitution. Law No. 3115 was
adopted on February 5, 1937, which inserted the principle of laicism as a
fundamental characteristic of the state. Since forth, both the Constitution
of 1961 and the current Constitution of 1982 have included mutually
pertinent reference to the principle, and have foreseen diverse layers of
constitutional protection against acts that might try to undermine it.
These mechanisms have been specifically put in place due to the direct
identification established between the principle and the state. Perceived
as the main dynamic of the revolutionary transformation of Turkey from
empire to nation-state, the principle is vital for protecting the State and
the nation. As expressed by the Court in 1998, laicism is the opposite of
Sharia.38 As the indicator of modernism, laicism has been the driving
force for Turkey in the transition from the "umma" 39 to the "nation. ' 4°
This is why Turkish laicism not only provides for State neutrality
towards all religions, but also puts into place a large number of
mechanisms that are specifically designed to "check and balance" the
influences of religion within the public sphere. These also include
mechanisms which actively foresee direct regulation of the religious
sphere by the State.
B. The Multi-Layered Normative Protection of Laicism under the
Turkish Constitution of 1982
Under Article 2 of the Constitution of 1982, the Turkish State is "a
democratic, laic and social state governed by the rule of law; bearing in
mind the concepts of public peace, national solidarity and justice;
respecting human rights; loyal to the nationalism of Atatiirk, and based
on the fundamental tenets set forth in the Preamble." Additionally,
Article 10 of the Constitution stipulates, "All individuals are equal
without any discrimination before the law, irrespective of language,
race, color, sex, political opinion, philosophical belief religion and sect,
or any such considerations" and affirms that the State has the obligation
"to ensure that this equality exists in practice"; obliging all organs of the
38. Islamic religious law.
39. The Islamic community. Under the Ottoman Empire nationhood was identified
through religious affiliation. Thus the "umma" would be compromised of communities
such as Turks, Albanians and Arabs and they would be considered one national unit,
while the non-Muslim communities were divided according to their church affiliation so
that the Armenians were separated as Catholics and Protestant and the Bulgarians and
Romanians were considered one single national unit. Ortayli Ilber, Osmanli Devletinde
Laiklik Hareketleri Ozerine [On Laicism Movements in the Ottoman State], cited in Dr.
Omit Doganay'im Anisma Armagan, 501 (1982) (Turk.).
40. See generally Judgment of 16 January 1998, E: 1997/1 (Siyasi Parti Kapatma),
K: 1998/1, Anayasa Mahkemesi [Constitutional Court] (Turkey).
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State to "act in compliance with the principle of equality before the law
in all their proceeding." In light of these two articles, the Turkish State
structure can be legally considered "religion-neutral." Yet, this
constitutional neutrality should not be perceived as indifference. On the
contrary, Turkish legal activism, which includes the regulation of the
external aspects of religion in order to implement the Turkish conception
of laicism, finds its normative basis in the multi-layered protection
mechanism provided by the Constitution. These mechanisms structured
to guard the principle are concretized within the Constitution under three
different layers of normative control: The Non-Protection Regime, The
Restriction of Fundamental Rights and Freedoms Regime and the
Irrevocable Provisions Regime.
1. The Non-Protection Regime
The first level of protection is provided by the non-protection
regime foreseen in the Preamble, and further built upon through Article
14 of the Constitution. Paragraph 5 of the Preamble, which under Article
176 of the Constitution forms "an integral part of the Constitution,"
plainly stipulates that "no protection shall be accorded to an activity
contrary to ... the nationalism, principles, reforms and modernism of
Atatiirk4' and that, as required by the principle of laicism," so as to
guarantee "no interference whatsoever by sacred religious feelings in
state affairs and politics." This provision is largely referred to by the
Court in cases that necessitate recourse to a teleological interpretation of
the principle. Further building upon this, the first paragraph of Article 14
on the Prohibition of Abuse of Fundamental Rights and Freedom
prescribes that "none of the rights and freedoms embodied in the
Constitution shall be exercised with the aim of violating the indivisible
integrity of the state with its territory and nation, and endangering the
existence of the democratic and laic order of the Turkish Republic based
upon human right." Consequently, interpreted in conjunction with the
Preamble, Article 14 provides an important tool depriving acts contrary
to laicism from constitutional justification. In other words, the pretext of
the enjoyment of a right or freedom cannot stand on a constitutional basis
if the involved acts are contrary to the principle.
2. The Restriction of Fundamental Rights and Freedoms Regime
The second level of protection, the limitation of fundamental rights
and freedoms regime, is established through direct restriction clauses
brought to specific fundamental rights and freedoms enumerated within
41. See supra note 18.
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the Constitution. For example, Article 24 of the Constitution which
regulates the Freedom of Religion and Conscience foresees both the
freedom and the necessary safeguards for potential conflict with the
principle of laicism. The Article reads:
Everyone has the right to freedom of conscience, religious belief and
conviction.
Acts of worship, religious services, and ceremonies shall be
conducted freely, provided that they do not violate the provisions of
Article 14.
No one shall be compelled to worship, or to participate in religious
ceremonies and rites, to reveal religious beliefs and convictions, or
be blamed or accused because of his religious beliefs and
convictions.
Education and instruction in religion and ethics shall be conducted
under state supervision and control. Instruction in religious culture
and moral education shall be compulsory in the curricula of primary
and secondary schools. Other religious education and instruction
shall be subject to the individual's own desire, and in the case of
minors, to the request of their legal representatives.
No one shall be allowed to exploit or abuse religion or religious
feelings, or things held sacred by religion, in any manner
whatsoever, for the purpose of personal or political influence, or for
even partially basing the fundamental, social, economic, political,
and legal order of the state on religious tenets.42
As it can be observed, despite the exclusive protection provided for
the forum internum of the freedom of religion, direct reference to the
"Abuse of Rights" clause and the clearly stipulated provisions of
paragraph 4 and 5 concerning state supervision over religious education
and the prohibition of abuse of religious feelings narrows the forum
externum of the freedom considerably. In practice the consequences of
these provisions are witnessed in cases that involve manifestations
involving acts of proselytism and religious education. In connection
with the latter, the Right and Duty of Training and Education formulated
under Article 42 also expressly stipulates that even though all possess the
right and freedom of not being "deprived of the right of learning and
education," this right should be "conducted along the lines of the
principles and reforms of Atatiirk, on the basis of contemporary science
42. TuRK. CONST. art. 24.
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and educational methods, under the supervision and control of the
state"; and in any case, the second paragraph of the Article also
expresses that the practice of this right in no way relieves citizens from
their duty of loyalty towards the Constitution. Similarly, other
fundamental human rights and freedoms under the Constitution which do
at certain levels interrelate with the effective enjoyment of the freedom
of religion 43 also contain distinctive restriction regimes, comparable to
the ones articulated in the Articles 24 and 42. Thus, the state is able to
intervene and restrict the effective enjoyment of rights and freedoms to
the extent that they contradict with the principle of laicism.
One other point to observe at this level concerns the last paragraph
of Article 42, which recognizes that in all circumstances concerning the
right to education "provisions of international treaties are reserved."
Taking into consideration the fact that in Turkish law duly ratified
international treaties have the force of law and that in circumstances of
conflict between a statute and an international treaty relative to
fundamental rights and freedoms the treaty rules prevail, some
regulations concerning religious education might raise issues under
various human rights treaties that have been ratified by Turkey. To
avoid such conflicts and protect the laic educational system, Turkey has
opted to place specific reservations to the treaty provisions on the right to
education. The reservation placed on March 10, 1954 to Article 2 of the
additional Protocol No I to the European Convention on Human Rights
can be cited as one such instance.45
43. Such rights and freedoms enumerated within the Constitution include: Article 20
on the right to the Privacy of Individual life, Article 21 on the Right to the Inviolability of
the Domicile, Article 22 on the Freedom of Communication, Article 23 on the Freedom
of Movement, Article 25 on the Freedom of Thought and Opinion, Article 26 on the
Freedom of Expression and Dissemination of Thought, Article 28 on the Freedom of the
Press, Article 33 and 34 on the Freedom of Association and Assembly.
44. The place of international treaties in Turkish law is established under Article 90
of the Constitution. The provision concerning the conflict rule between legislation and
international treaties was introduced into Article 90 through an amendment law (Law No.
5170) in 2004. This step was taken in order to harmonize Turkish legislation with
European human rights standards within the scope of EU accession talks. Before the
amendment, no such conflict rule existed, resulting in the adoption of different standards
of application by different levels of the judiciary when a conflict arose between human
right treaties and national statutes.
45. Article 3 of Law No. 6366 foresees that "The second article of the Additional
Protocol to the European Convention on the Protection of Human Rights and
Fundamental Freedoms cannot breach the provisions of Law No. 430 adopted in 3
March 1924 on the Unification of the Educational System."
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3. The Irrevocable Provisions Regime
The third and without a doubt most important level of normative
protection brought towards the principle is the general self-preservation
regime foreseen directly for the principle of laicism and indirectly
extended towards the specific legislation which materialize its concrete
application. The first step of this regime is articulated under the
"Irrevocable Provisions ' 46 clause set forth by Article 4 of the
Constitution which states, "The provision of Article 1 of the Constitution
establishing the form of the state as a Republic, the provisions in Article
2 on the characteristics of the Republic ... shall not be amended, nor
shall their amendment be proposed." Therefore, the principle of laicism
is protected against initiatives that aspire to distort its presence as a
constitutional norm through direct modification to the constitutional text.
This regime is supplemented by an indirect protection clause provided
under Article 174, which extends protection to the "Reform Laws"
incarnating in concreto the principle of laicism; thus foreseeing their
constitutional self-preservation.
According to Article 174:
No provision of the Constitution shall be construed or interpreted as
rendering unconstitutional the Reform Laws indicated below, which
aim to raise Turkish society above the level of contemporary
civilization and to safeguard the laic character of the Republic, and
which were in force on the date of the adoption by referendum of the
Constitution of Turkey.47
These laws and principles which are considered de iure constitutional
include the Law on the Unification of the Educational System; the Law
on the Wearing of Hats; the Law on the Closure of Dervish Monasteries
and Tombs, the Abolition of the Office of Keeper of Tombs and the
Abolition and Prohibition of Certain Titles; The Principle of civil
marriage according to which marriage act shall be concluded in the
presence of the competent official, adopted with the Turkish Civil Code
46. This regime is not unique. There are other countries that have similar regimes
provided within their constitutional system. Just to cite a few, Article 79 of the
Constitution of Germany (Grundgesetz ffir die Bundesrepublik Deutschland 79GG.),
Article 152 of the Constitution of Romania (1991 CoNsT. 152.), Article 139 of the
Constitution of Italy (COST. 139.), and Article 89 of the Constitution of France (1958
COST. 89.) all recognize the non amenable nature of certain core principles, values or
political institutions. On the other hand, some countries which have no such clear
provisions have through jurisprudence developed a similar strategy of self preservation.
For example the Indian Supreme Court in the Case ofKesavananda Baharati formulated
the similar rationale under a "Theory of Basic Structure." Kesavananda Bharati v. State
ofKerala, A.I.R 1973 S.C. 1461, 1510.
47. TuRK. CONST. art. 174.
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of 1926; The Law on the Adoption of International Numerals; The Law
on the Adoption and Application of the Turkish Alphabet; The Law on
the Abolition of Titles and Appellations such as Efendi, Bey or Pa~a and
The Law on the Prohibition of the Wearing of Certain Garments. Thus,
whatever the circumstances be, it becomes impossible to allege the
illegality of any measures taken under these statutes since they are
directly elevated to a semi-constitutional status.
At this point it is always possible for one to inquire about the lack of
direct protection to the Articles 4 and 174, since it remains
constitutionally possible to amend these two articles before any direct
attempt to modify the norms that they protect. True that may be from a
normative perspective; it is exactly at this point that the Court, through
jurisprudence, has formulated the necessary functional safeguard against
any such indirect attempt. Based on a rationale of self-preservation, the
"Protection against indirect amendments" regime construed by the Court
has in effect structured a conception of the Constitution which affords to
the principle of laicism a de facto functional hierarchy over most other
provisions. It will be exactly this point which will give rise to one of the
major arguments in the case concerning the annulment of Law No. 5735
concerning the "Turban Amendment." However, in order understand the
legal discourse; it is of foremost importance to illustrate the existential
significance afforded to laicism by the Turkish constitutional judge.
C. The Existential Significance of Laicism under the Court's
Teleological Interpretation
As the guardian of the constitutional order, the Court has also
become the central pillar for the protection of laicism. Numerous factors
have contributed to this stance, including domestic and international
developments such the perceived proliferation of political fundamentalist
religious movements, as well as the aforementioned historical context
which identifies the state directly with the principle. Thus, the principle
is recognized not only as one of the main pillars of the Turkish state, but
also as the basis of fundamental democratic values. Since, as described
by the Court-from a historical standpoint,-being "a tool of transition
to democracy" renders laicism a pivotal value within "Turkey's
existential philosophy.' ' s This value has also effected the conception of
the principle itself, differentiating it both in theory and practice, from its
western origins.
48. Judgment of 16 January 1998, E: 1997/1 (Siyasi Parti Kapatma), K: 1998/1,
Anayasa Mahkemesi [Constitutional Court] (Turkey). For the existential importance of
laicism, see also Billent Tan6r & Necmi, YUizbasioglu, supra note 25, at 81.
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1. The differentiation of Turkish Laicism
In face of arguments of deviation from its original conception, the
Court has expressed that the necessity for this differentiation was evident
since "laicism is not only a philosophical and ideological concept, [but]
is a principle that is implemented"; thus influenced by the "religious,
political and social conditions of the country that it is applied.'A9 Within
this sense, when Turkey abandoned the theocratic imperial model of
state, and adopted through revolutionary reforms democratic
republicanism, it has interpreted the meaning of laicism "somewhat
different from that of the western world."50 The influence of the concrete
conditions of the Country has transformed the principle into an essential
deterrent against "a worldview that might prevent any endeavor for the
development of the society and its attainment of the standards of modern
civilization. 51 Thus, its application presents a greater importance for
Turkey when compared with some western states that do not seem to be
under any concrete risk of regressive movements, threatening on the long
run the State's political regime. Elaborating on this difference the Court
acknowledged this difference, stating that:
It is natural that the principle of laicism should be inspired by the
present conditions of each country and the characteristics of each
religion, and that the conformity or non-conformity of these
conditions and characteristics should project on the understanding of
laicism producing different attributes and practices ... due to the
differences of the religions of Islam and Christianity, the cases and
the results in our country and western countries have been different.
The adoption on the same level and understanding of the practice of
laicism in countries with different religions and religious
understandings cannot be expected. This situation is the natural
result of the distinction between the circumstances and rules.
Moreover, the conception of laicism in western countries that
embrace the same religion has shown contrast.52
With this rationale in hand, the Court has expressed that within the
context of Turkey, laicism carries an existential significance, identifying
the principle with the Turkish revolution from empire to nation.53




52. Judgment of 16 January 1998, E: 1997/1 (Siyasi Parti Kapatma), K: 1998/1,
Anayasa Mahkemesi [Constitutional Court] (Turkey).
53. Qetin Ozek, 100 Soruda Tiirkiye'de Gerici Akimlar [Regressive Movements in
Turkey in 100 Questions], 121 (1968).
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2. The Existential Significance of Laicism
When giving meaning to the principle, the Court has naturally
adopted a teleological approach, taking first and foremost the
justification for the principles initial adoption during the Republics
foundation: "the institutionalization of the state according to the rules of
reason and science., 54  Building upon this, the Court furthermore
expressed its own perception of the concept:
Laicism is the regulator of political, social, cultural modem life based
on national sovereignty, democracy, freedom and science. It is the
principle that provides the individual the possibilities of individuality
and free opinion, thus necessitating the differentiation of politics-
religion and belief in order to provide freedom of religion and
conscience.
55
The consequence of this vision is the perception that laicism not only
separates the religious from the state, but it does this in order to free the
individual from pressures of religious belief, enabling freedom of
religion to be practiced to the greatest extent possible. The Court
reinforces this point of view by emphasizing that the freedom of religion
can only be achieved in a laic order where:
[r]eligion is freed from politicization; it is removed from being a tool
of governance, left in its respectful place in the conscience of
individuals. The rule that material matters are dealt with laic law,
spiritual matters are dealt with their own rules is one of the
foundations that modem democracies are based upon. Construing
public regulations according to religious rules is inconceivable. The
foundation of regulations cannot be religious rules.
56
For the Court, the concept of the equality of all before the law
necessitates such an interpretation since:
The Democratic and laic state does not discriminate between
individuals based on their beliefs. Everyone is free to choose their
religion, express their beliefs within the confines of the freedom of
religion and conscience. In a laic society, the individual's choice of
holding religion and belief is outside of the legislatives influence.
The suggestion that the State prefers one of the religions is also
contrary to the equality of citizens whom adhere to different
religions. Being able to express true freedom of conscience in laic
54. Judgment of 16 January 1998, E: 1997/1 (Siyasi Parti Kapatma), K: 1998/1,
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states also demonstrates that laicism is the assurance of this
freedom.
57
According to this vision, laicism enables within Turkey pluralism
and democracy. This last point has also been adopted with clear
reference to the Court's jurisprudence by other levels of judiciary. For
example, in a high profile case before it, Turkish Court of Appeals
(Yargitay) reiterated the Court's vision on laicism by stating that from a
legal perspective, laicism was the pre-condition of Turkish democracy
and within this sense it was natural for there to exist a differentiation in
conception between European laicism which was a result of the
formation of the nation state and Turkish laicism which was the pre-
condition of the formation of Turkish nation-state.5 8 The unification of
two different concepts such as "nation" and "laicism" is the result of the
"Turkish path of secularization" which "is an amalgam of religion,
nation, and laicism that is unique not just among Islamic societies but
worldwide., 59  It is then natural for Turkish laicism to include some
specific elements that may not be found in other laic/secular states.
3. The Essential Elements of Turkish Laicism
When taken into context with the detailed reference to the principle
within the Constitution and the multi-layered protection mechanisms
formulated around it, the Court has been able to adopt a firm application
of the principle. The importance put on the principle made it natural to
recognize to the "State the right of control and supervision of religious
issue" which could not be "considered a restriction to the freedom of
religion and conscience in violation of the necessities of the democratic
social order.",60  To this effect, the Court has spelled out clearly the
57. Id.
58. Turkish Court of Appeals (Yargitay), Judgment, General Penal Council (Ceza
Genel Kurulu), 15 March 2005, E: 2004/8-201, K: 2005/30. The case concerned an
article named "The Terror of Religion Enmity" written by a known Islamist columnist, in
which the author alleged the atheism of all who were adverse to the Islamic veil as the
symbol of Islam and in which defamatory language was constantly used against the laic
segments of society. See id. Similarly anti-Semitism was a reoccurring theme within the
article. See id. The Court of Appeals, after an elaborate analysis on the international
standards of the freedom of expression, which included not only domestic, foreign and
international jurisprudence but also contemporary doctrinal literature, arrived to the
conclusion that the author had committed the crime of inciting the population to hatred
and enmity. See id.
59. Cemal Karakas, Turkey: Islam and Laicism Between the Interests of State,
Politics, and Society, 78 PEACE RESEARCH INSTITUTE FRANKFURT REPORTS, at 8 (2007),
available at http://www.hsfk.de/fileadmin/downloads/prif78.pdf.
60. Judgment of 16 Jan. 1998, E: 1997/1 (Siyasi Parti Kapatma), K: 1998/1,
Anayasa Mahkemesi [Constitutional Court] (Turkey).
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essential elements of the application of the principle of laicism within the
Turkish context, which are:
a-) The Adoption of the principal that religion should not be
sovereign and effective in State affairs,
b-) Religion should be constitutionally protected, recognizing that the
area of religion which deals with the spiritual life of individuals
should be, without discrimination, an unrestricted freedom,
c-) Restrictions should be accepted in order to protect public order,
safety and interests and prohibit the abuse of religion for the aspects
of religion, which exceed individuals spiritual life, effect their social
acts and behaviors,
d-) Recognize to the State, as the protector of public order and rights,
the competence of supervision over religious rights and
freedoms .... 61
In particular the last point of this articulation determines openly the
margin of maneuver recognized to the State for an active interventionist
approach towards the external manifestations of religion.62 It is also this
element, in conjunction with the Court's elaborate teleological
interpretation, which has allowed it to come to the conclusion that the
significance of laicism gracefully provides it the necessary legal
justification for an expansion of the legal extent of its own judicial
control over legislative acts.63 It is this last point which resides behind
the complicated legal matrix of constitutional interpretation and judicial
activism, which above all has formulated the prohibition of the Islamic
veil in higher education in Turkey.64
II. LEGISLATIVE ACTION, JUDICIAL COUNTER ACTION: AN OVERVIEW
OF THE PROHIBITION ON THE USE OF THE ISLAMIC VEIL IN HIGHER
EDUCATION AND THE CASE CONCERNING THE "TURBAN
AMENDMENT"
In Turkey it is currently not possible for a female student to attend
classes or take exams in the campuses of higher education establishments
while wearing the Islamic veil.65 This prohibition is the result of a





65. See GILLEs KEPEL, JIHAD 350-51 (4th ed. 2006) (2002).
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complex juxtaposition of judicial interpretation of constitutional norms
and values; since there does not exist any clear constitutional provision
or openly stipulated statute that foresees such a prohibition.66 Within this
context, the prohibition is derived more from the essence of the
constitutional text rather than its wording.67  The prohibition is
formulated upon the core existential values of the republican regime
enumerated in Article 2 of the Constitution; namely the democratic and
laic state order.68 Its legal justification is construed upon concepts of
gender equality and the protection of the rights and freedoms of others as
well as the safeguard of public order and state neutrality. 69  It is
interesting to observe that within the dialectics surrounding the issue,
those in support and those against it have both been able to formulate
their arguments upon the effective enjoyment of fundamental human
rights.70  Those against the prohibition have voiced the freedom of
religion for "practicing Muslim female students," while those in support
have introduced a similar argument, but with regards to third party rights
concerning abusive proselytism and discrimination.71
Within this context, the development and application of the
"operational prohibition" 72 of the use of the Islamic veil in higher
education provides us the perfect example of the interpretation of the
principle of laicism by the Court and the functional hierarchy afforded to
it with regards to other norms. In order to illustrate this interesting
interaction of laicism and the freedom of religion, a brief account of the
political and legal background surrounding the issue is necessary. For
this end, this section will first provide a concise history of the "politics of
law" that have ended with the establishment of the prohibition.
Secondly, it will illustrate the functional and defacto hierarchy afforded
to the principle, which allows the Court to extend its jurisdictional reach.
To conclude, the Court's perception on the substantial conformity of the
Islamic veil in higher education with the principle of laicism shall be
exposed in light of its recent judgment in the case concerning Law No.
5735 on the "Turban Amendment.,
73
66. See generally TURK. CONST.
67. See generally id.
68. See id. art 2.
69. See GILLES KEPEL, JIHAD 350-51 (4th ed. 2006) (2002).
70. See id.
71. See id.
72. We use the term 'operational prohibition' in order to maintain the idea that the
prohibition does not derive from a clearly stipulated statute but from interpretation of
constitutional principles.
73. Law No. 5735 of Feb. 23, 2008, Resmi Gazete [R.G.] No. 26796 (Sep. 2, 2008)
(Turk.).
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A. A Short Story of the Prohibition on the Use of the Islamic Veil in
Higher Education
While there has always been a socio-political struggle between
religious movements and the state since the foundation of the Republic,
74
the debate concerning the use of the Islamic veil in higher education
attracted more public attention during the 1970's. 75  This period of
Turkey's history was characterized by large-scale urbanization-a
process that begun in the 1950's-coinciding conservative policies due
to the increase of newly urbanized rural populations in large cities and
the external dynamics of the Cold War Era.76 These developments
eventually resulted with the increase of visibility of orthodox religious
lifestyle in daily life.77 As the number of female students preferring to
use the Islamic veil in higher education grew, so did social anxiety,
mostly about the politicization of religious beliefs in direct defiance to
the principle of laicism, mature amongst the established laic segments of
78society. Within this context, the first reactionary measure came from
the University of Ankara, which in 1967 terminated the university
affiliation of Mrs. Hatice Babacan, a female student at the Faculty of
Theology who insisted entering classes wearing the Islamic veil.79
Lacking any clear regulation on the issue and the increase of polarization
in public opinion, the issue morphed into a socio-political confrontation
between various actors and, needless to say, developed into a political
quarrel between opposing political parties.8° On one side, the supporters
of the freedom to wear the Islamic veil alleged repressive violation of the
74. MEHMET OZAY, ISLAMIC IDENTITY AND DEVELOPMENT STUDIES OF THE ISLAMIC
PERIPHERY 119-20 (1990). For example, on the 23 d of December 1930 members of the
Nagshbandi religious order rallied crowds in the town of Menemen, demanding the
restoration of Islamic rule. See id. The incident also known as the "Kubilay Incident"
escalated after the crowds overwhelmed the forces sent to quell the uprising and the
leader of the forces, Lieutenant Mustafa Fehmi Kubilay was beheaded and his head put
on a pole to be paraded throughout the town. See id. This incident resulted with the
declaration of martial law in the region after which 28 people were condemned with the
death penalty by court martial. See id. This and similar incidents during the formation of
the Republic would seem to on a larger scale push the central authority to become more
aggressive in implementing policies of laicization. See id Such incidents have also
become points of consideration for the Turkish judiciary in conceptualizing Turkish
laicism. See id.
75. See Fadwa El Guindi, The Veil Becomes a Movement, in WOMEN AND ISLAM:
SOCIAL CONDmONS, OBSTACLES, AND PROSPECTS 70, 70-72 (Haideh Moghissi ed., 2005).
76. See Burgak Keskin, Confronting Double Patriarchy: Islamist Women in Turkey,
in RIGHT-WING WOMEN: FROM CONSERVATIVES TO EXTREMISTS AROUND THE WORLD
245, 249 (Paola Bacchetta & Margaret Power eds., 2002).
77. See id.
78. See id.
79. See id. at 245-57.
80. See id. at 249.
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freedom of religion and the right to education.81 Opposing this idea, and
mostly supported by the laic state establishment, people perceived the
Islamic veil movement as the manifestation of political Islam and a direct
threat to the laic Republic. There was genuine anxiety that the
satisfaction of this demand would put pressure on Muslim female
students who preferred not to manifest their beliefs as such and it would
also open the door for similar future demands for entry into public
service.83 As an expressive religious symbol such a development was
also perceived to hurt deeply state neutrality.84
1. The Prohibition under the Constitution of 1982
After the adoption of the Constitution of 1982, the newly
established Council of Higher Education adopted a circular on the 2 0 th of
December 1982, which for the first time prohibited the use of the Islamic
veil in higher education. 85  Based on this circular, higher education
establishments adopted prohibitory measures through internal circulars
and took disciplinary measures against students who acted contrary to
these regulations.86 Due to the request for the relaxation of the
prohibition by the governing right wing Motherland Party (Anavatan
Partisi), the Council of Higher Education adopted on the 10 th of March
1984 another circular which eased the restrictions.87 This new circular
foresaw a differentiation between the various covers used by females and
prohibited the traditional headscarf (ba¢6rtisii) while accepting more
modern covers such as the Tfirban.88  Having not articulated the
differences between the methods of covering the hair and head, this
circular naturally gave rise to differences in practice.89 On the other side
the Council of State (Danttay) upheld the validity of disciplinary
measures taken by some higher education establishments against the use
of the Islamic veil, expressing their conformity to the law in force. 90 In
81. See Burcak, supra note 76, at 245-57.
82. See id.
83. See id.
84. See generally Case of Leyla $ahin v. Turkey, 41 Eur. H.R. Rep. 8 (2005)
(ECtHR), 44 Eur. H.R. Rep 5 (2007) (Grand Chamber).
85. See Burgak, supra note 76, at 249.
86. See id.
87. See id
88. See id. at 249-53.
89. See id. at 245-57.
90. Judgment of Feb. 23, 1984, Eighth Chamber, E: 207, K: 330, Danistay Dergisi
[Review of the Council of State] [D.D.] (Turk.); Judgment of Oct. 3, 1989, Eighth
Chamber, E: 84, K: 724, Danistay Dergisi [Review of the Council of State] [D.D.].
(Turk.) Council of State, Judgment, 8th Chamber, 23 February 1984, E: 207, K: 330;
Council of State, Judgment, 8th Chamber, 3 October 1989, E: 84, K: 724.
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1984 the Council of State expressed clearly its perception according to
which the Islamic veil was not an innocent practice per se, and instead it
was becoming "the symbol of a worldview contrary to the freedom of
women and the fundamental principles of our Republic."91 Relying on
the jurisprudence of the Council of State, the Council of Higher
Education once more prohibited the general use of the Islamic veil in
higher education with a decision on the 2 4th of December 1987.92
In order to resolve the issue through legislation, Law No. 3511 was
introduced by the governing party and was adopted by the Parliament in
1989.93 Aticle 2 of the law provided for an Additional Article 16, which
read "[w]ithin higher education establishments, classrooms, laboratories,
clinics, and policlinics and in corridors it is obligatory to be in modern
clothing and looks, he closing of the neck and hair with a cloth or with a
turban due to religious reasons is unrestricted," to be added to Law No.
2547 on Higher Education.94 The article was clear enough to avoid any
discussion that the various measures taken by higher education
establishments and the Council for Higher Education would thus become
null and void. 95 However this legislation was taken to the Court by the
President of the Republic on grounds of violating the principles
enshrined in the Preamble and Articles 296 and 1097 of the Constitution.98
Reaching its decision on the 7th of March 1989, by 10 votes to 1, the
Court annulled Law No. 3511 for violating the Preamble and Articles 2,
10, 24 and 174 of the Constitution.99
In its judgment the Court observed that "the principle that
sovereignty resides in the nation" also had to be understood as meaning
that "it does not reside in religion" and within this sense "loyalty and
respect to laicism in education and instruction" had to be considered in
detail.100 For the Court the constitutional invalidity of the abuse of
religion for political ends also extended to the domain of education and
instruction.01 Consequently "the necessity to refrain from the use of
91. See Judgment of Feb. 23, 1984, Eighth Chamber, E: 207, K: 330, Danistay
Dergisi [Review of the Council of State] [D.D.] (Turk.).
92. See Burqak, supra note 76, at 245-57.




96. See TURK. CONST. art. 2.
97. See id. art. 10.
98. See generally Law No. 3511 of Dec. 12, 1988, Resmi Gazete [R.G.] No. 20032
(Dec. 27, 2008) (Turk.).
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symbols that represent religious beliefs in classrooms and relevant
places" in higher education establishments was the basis of the non-
conformity between the Islamic veil and the scientific environment.
10 2
For this reason the Court did not see an issue arise due to the regulation
of clothing in higher education. 10 3 Firstly, the Court's aforementioned
conception of laicism had already provided it the necessary legal
justification in regulating the religious field.' °4 Secondly, the Courts
underlined the fact that "[r]egulating its own institutions is a State's most
natural right," and since "male and female clothing in public or private
life [could not] be regulated by law according to religious tenets" it
would be similarly impossible to regulate the public sphere according to
religion; the only acceptable formula was regulations conducted
"according to legal necessities."' 1 5 With regards to the enjoyment of
fundamental rights argument, the Court preferred to thwart any such
claim expressing abstract views on a democracy without restrictions,
isolated of the concrete circumstances of the case, were constitutionally
unsound since, "exploiting freedoms in order to cast down freedoms"
was unacceptable; and within this sense, "forcing people to dress in this
or that manner and cover their heads [would] cause discrepancy between
those who are of a different or even of the same religion."'10 6 That is why
the Court perceived that "freedoms that were not in conformity with
laicism" would not gain validity and "could not be defended or
protected."' 0 7 This ruling was important, for not only had the Court
upheld the numerous prohibitory practices undertaken by higher
education establishments, but it had also for the first time explicitly set
the lacking constitutional basis of the prohibition. 1
08
After having failed to solve the problem, the Parliament adopted
Law No. 3670 in 1990, as yet again an attempt to overcome the
prohibition.'0 9 This time, the legislation was drafted with an open ended
formula, containing no reference to religion at all in order to bypass the
Court's Judgment of 1989.110 Article 12 of the Law foresaw the insertion
of an Additional Article 17, which read: "[w]ithout being contrary to
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establishment,""'1 into Law No. 2547 on Higher Education., 12 Law No.
3670 also comprised a Transitional Article which provided for a general
amnesty for students who had already received disciplinary measures due
to the use of the Islamic veil.' 13  Without reference to political or
religious ideology, the articulation of a freedom could not be evaluated
as violating any constitutional norm. 1 4 Since no clearly stipulated law
prohibiting the use of the Islamic veil in higher education existed, the
problem would thus be solved."15
Law No. 3670 was this time taken to the Court by the opposition
party.' 16 The Court rendered its judgment in 1991.117 As expected, the
Court found that the law was conform to the Constitution and refused the
request for its annulment. 18 Nevertheless, in its reasoning the Court also
pronounced that the phrase "[w]ithout being contrary to law in force" in
Additional Article 17 had to be interpreted extensively." 9 Within this
sense, the expression "law" did not only imply statutes, but also included
in its entire framework the Constitution as norm-superior, as well as the
Court's jurisprudence; 120 since as articulated by Article 153 of the
Constitution, "the Constitutional Court Judgments... are binding on the
legislature, executive and judiciary, administrative offices, natural and
legal persons."'' Hence, the freedom stipulated by Additional Article 17
on the clothing and attire of students in higher education' establishments
had to be "accepted as not including 'the closing of the neck and hair
with a cloth or turban due to religious beliefs"' given that the Court's
order of 1989 had already articulated this fact.12 2  Thus, taken into
consideration in conjunction with the Judgment of 1989, the Court's
Judgment of 1991 became the constitutional reference point for higher
education establishments which moved to prohibit the entry of students
wearing the Islamic veil into their compounds.
123
111. See id.
112. See Law No. 2547 of Nov. 4, 1981, Resmi Gazete [R.G.] No. 17506 (Nov. 6,
1981) (Turk.).




116. See id; Judgment of 9 Apr. 1991, E: 1990/36, K: 1991/8, Anayasa Mahkemesi
[Constitutional Court] (Turkey).





121. TURK. CONST. art. 153.
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2. The "28 February Process" and the Generalization of the
Prohibition
With the rise of conservative votes in the 1990's, the pro-
Islamist/conservative Welfare Party won the 1995 National Elections and
formed the 54 h government in coalition with the right wing True Path
Party (Do ,ru Yol Partisi).124  Some of the practices of the coalition
government and specific scandalous events that took place during those
years stirred great anxiety within the laic establishment. 125 On the 2 8th of
February 1997, in what would be come to be known as the "28 February
Process," the National Security Council adopted Decision No. 406126
which expressed the necessity to adopt policies in order to fight against
"regressive" religious movements.127 Article 1 of the decision explicitly
declared the necessity to reinforce the principle of laicism and Article 13
advised that the public authorities should apply the Constitutional Court
judgments with regards to practices which result in the use of regressive
attire.128 This process resulted on one side with the dissolution of the
Welfare Party and on the other side brought great increase in the
numbers of higher education establishments which effectively exercised
the prohibition on the Islamic veil through reference to the Courts
jurisprudence in conjunction with Article 153 of the Constitution.121
124. See Ibrahim Dalmis & Ertan Aydin, The Social Bases of the Justice and
Development Party, in SECULAR AND ISLAMIC POLITICS IN TURKEY, THE MAKING OF THE
JUSTICE AND DEVELOPMENT PARTY 201, 207 ([mit Cirze ed., 2008).
125. See generally id. at 201-222. Some include the pro-Islamist statements of the
Prime minister during his visits to Egypt, Libya and Nigeria in 1996; a scandalous traffic
accident near the town of Susurluk in 1996 in which a mafia member, a politician and a
chief of police were found riding in the same car; declarations of numerous members of
the Welfare party promoting Sharia; a Ramadan dinner hosted by the Prime minister for
the leaders of religious sects, orders and cults. See generally YAEL NAVARO-YASHIN,
FACES OF THE STATE 50-200 (2002).
126. See NIYAzI GUNAY, IMPLEMENTING THE 'FEBRUARY 28' RECOMMENDATIONS: A
SCORECARD (2001), available at http://www.thewashingtoninstitute.org/template
C04.php?CID=218 (follow "Download Now" hyperlink).
127. See MELIHA BENLI ALTUNISIK & OZLEM TOR, TURKEY CHALLENGES OF
CONTINUITY AND CHANGE 59-62 (2005). Some of the advised policies included the
adoption of nationwide 8-year obligatory laic education and the effective supervision of
private foundations, schools and dormitories administered by religious orders and their
transfer to the Ministry of Education under the Unitarian education system. See id.
Although the decisions of the National Security Council legally have non-binding status,
the heavy presence of the military establishment within the Council, and the experience
of former coup d'dtats initiated by the military naturally gave them great political weight.
See id.
128. See NIYAzI GUNAY, IMPLEMENTING THE 'FEBRUARY 28' RECOMMENDATIONS: A
SCORECARD (2001), available at http://www.thewashingtoninstitute.org/template
C04.php?CID=218 (follow "Download Now" hyperlink).
129. See TURK. CONST. art. 153. Naturally this also gave rise to non-uniform practice
between various universities and institutes nationwide and caused a new debate about the
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This operational prohibition based on the Court's jurisprudence of
1989-1991 is still applied within higher education establishments in
Turkey.1 30  Female students who wish to use the Islamic veil as the
manifestation of their religious beliefs may not do so within the confines
of higher education establishments, during classes and exams.' 31 The
issue rests as a potential field of conflict between the various segments of
society and a political clash which clearly speaks to conservative
constituencies.' 32  To this respect, it is not a surprise that the latest
initiative for unrestricting the use of the Islamic veil within higher
education came from the governing Justice and Development Party and
was actively supported by the Nationalist Action Party; both right wing
conservative parties. 133 Having noted the failures of similar previous
attempts, and as a final solution, this last initiative foresaw the direct
amendment of the Constitution as to bypass the Court's potential
scrutiny. 134 However, this initiative misguidedly ignored a fact known
by constitutional lawyers: the Court had already within its power the
"Control of Form in Substance" formula that it had developed as a
protection against indirect amendments to the irrevocable articles
regime 135 and which it was more than willing to use.
B. The "Control of Form in Substance "for the Protection of Laicism
When Law No. 5735 was approved by the National Assembly, the
main legal dilemma was not if the legislation would per se allow the use
of all religious symbols in higher education and thus limit previous
judicial interpretations of laicism. 136 The political process that preceded
the adoption of the legislation made it clear that such was the aim of the
legislation and that the administration would interpret it so. 137 So when
the main opposition Party took the legislation to the Court, the primary
question discussed was rather the competence of the Court vis-A-vis
constitutional amendments. Supporters of the amendment relied upon
Article 148/1 of the Constitution which limited the jurisdiction of the
prohibition and the interpretation of Additional Article 17. See Judgment of 9 Apr. 1991,
E: 1990/36, K: 1991/8, Anayasa Mahkemesi [Constitutional Court] (Turkey).
130. See Burgak, supra note 76, at 245-57.
131. See id.
132. See id.
133. See generally Dalmis & Aydin, supra note 124, at 201-222; NAVARO-YASHIN,
supra note 125, at 118 (2002).
134. See TuRK. CONST.
135. See id.
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Court. 13 8  Under the Article, it was foreseen that "[c]onstitutional
amendments [could] be examined and verified only with regard to their
form. ' 139 Thus, the Court could only examine the amendments adoption
process and in no case enter into discussions with regards to the
substance of the text. 140 From a literal application of Article 148/1, there
would be no debate that the amendment satisfied the criteria provided by
constitutional provisions concerning the adoption of constitutional
amendments. 141 So, as can be expected, when the Court annulled Law
No. 5735 declaring it contrary to the Constitution, the Court was accused
of overstepping its jurisdiction and acting unconstitutionally.
However, we must remark that long before the case on Law No.
5735 concerning the "Turban Amendment" the Court had already
formulated a steady jurisprudence on its own jurisdiction vis-a-vis
constitutional amendments. Within this sense, the recognition of
jurisdiction by the Court should not have come as a surprise. An
illustration of the interpretative rationale of the Court with regards to its
jurisdiction also provides an important example of the importance placed
on the irrevocable provisions, including laicism, within Turkish
constitutional tradition.
1. Judicial Control over Indirect Attempts to Modify the
Irrevocable Provisions of the Constitution
Since the day it was established, the Court had always adopted an
approach according to which the jurisdictional framework of the Court
was interpreted extensively when it concerned adoption of constitutional
amendments which might relate to the irrevocable provisions. According
to the Court, explicitly and a fortiori implicitly, amendments affecting
the legal construct put forth by the irrevocable articles regime under
Article 4 of the Constitution were open to its scrutiny since legislative
power could and should not be conceived as legibus solutus.14 2 In 1970
the Court had bypassed a debate on its jurisdictional reach under the
1961 Constitution which comprised a parallel irrevocable articles regime.
In that case the Court had come to the conclusion that:
138. See TuRK. CONST. art. 148/1.
139. See id.
140. See id.
141. See id. The procedure for the amendment of the Constitution is foreseen under
Article 175 of the Constitution. See id., art. 175. The provision articulates that for an
amendment to be proposed it has to be done by one third of the legislature, and adopted
with the support of three fifths of the members of Parliament. See id.
142. Where a designated person is "not bound by the law." BLACK'S LAW
DICTIONARY (8th ed. 2004).
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With its article 9, the 1961 Constitution has put in place the principle
of irrevocability. According to this article, "the Constitutional
provision which dictates that the form of the State is a Republic
cannot be amendment and such an amendment cannot be proposed."
It is unnecessary to say that the principle of irrevocability here does
not aim solely at the expression "Republic." In other words, to think
that in only accepting the irrevocability of the expression "Republic,"
it is possible to change all other principles and rules in the
Constitution, cannot be reconciled with this constitutional principle.
For, the aim of the irrevocability principle within article 9 is the State
system articulated by the expression "Republic" defined by the
fundamental principles within article 1 and article 2 and within the
Preamble as referred to by article 2. In other words, it is not the
expression "Republic," but the Republic regime with its character
defined by the aforementioned articles of the Constitution that article
9 binds the principle of irrevocability. Then, the unconstitutional
character of proposing and accepting a Constitutional amendment
which only keeps in place the expression "Republic," but either
entirely or partially or by method of annulling all its elements in
order to bring a regime, which ever direction it might lead to, but is
impossible to conform with the principles of the Constitution of
1961, is undisputable.
Within this context, no law can be proposed or adopted which aim to
change these principles through direct or indirect amendments to
them or to other provisions of the Constitution. Any law adopted
contrary to these conditions cannot at all effect and amend present
provisions of the Constitution nor bring a Constitutional rule.
Thus it can be seen that according to article 147 of the Constitution
the Constitutional Court also has the duty to control in substance over
laws foreseeing amendments to the Constitution. 1
43
Similarly, in another case before the Court in 1977, the same
rationale was stipulated by the applicant, the 5th Chamber of the Council
of State, expressing that:
It is stated in article 9 of the Constitution that "The Constitutional
Provision foreseeing the States form as a Republic cannot be
amended and amendments cannot be proposed." The Constitution of
1961 has foreseen through article 9 the irrevocability principle and
143. Judgment of 16 Jun. 1970, Official Gazette 7.6.1971/13858, E: 1970/1 K:
1970/31, Anayasa Mahkemesi [Constitutional Court] (Turkey).
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has then provided the proposal prohibition. Thus, in substance the
provision of article 9 concerning its form consists of a two way rule.
This irrevocability principle not only aims at the word Republic, it
includes the outer principles and rules that forms the Republic. The
true goal of the irrevocability principle under article 9 is the State
system which is designated as Republic, whose characteristic is
specified by the fundamental principles and rules referred under
article 1 and 2 and the Preamble cited in article 2.
No law can be proposed or adopted which aim a change in the
principle and rules that specify in our Constitution the characteristics
of the Republic's regime or through changes in other articles of the
Constitution aim to change directly or indirectly these principles.
The Turkish State which is specified as a Republic in article 1 of the
Constitution is, as expressed in article 2, a national, democratic, laic
and social state of law based on human rights and the fundamental
principles specified in the Preamble....
The proposal of an amendment to the Constitution which foresees to
change these principles and the attributes that the Turkish State rests
upon, defined by the Constitution as a national, democratic, laic and
social state of law based on human rights and the fundamental
principles specified in the Preamble, is thus, on the basis of this
prohibition, impossible. Because, a change brought to them would
result also in a modification on the basic foundation and function of
the Turkish State as a Republic as characterized above•
As it can be seen, judicial opinion had always reinstated the view
that the provision which limits the Court's competence with "form," is
not limited to the procedural aspects of constitutional amendments but
also includes-under a teleological approach to the irrevocable articles
regime-the necessity of examining the substance of any proposed
constitutional amendment in order to determine if it can be proposed in
the first place. There is no doubt that this reasoning can be easily
justified since constitutions are not simple legal texts devoted to
mechanic procedure, but above all, also represent an inseparable political
philosophy whose revision might constitute the revision of the state.
1 45
144. Judgment of 27 Sept. 1977, Official Gazette 14.1.1978/16169, E: 1977/82 K:
1977/117, Anayasa Mahkemesi [Constitutional Court] (Turkey).
145. Kemal Grzler, Sur la Validitg des Limites a la Rivision Constitutionnelle
Ddduites de I'Esprit de la Constitution [On the Validity of Limitations on Constitutional
Amendment Inferred from the Spirit of Constitution], Annales de la Facultd de droit
d'Istanbul, Vol. XXXI, Mai 1997, at 109-21, available at www.anayasa.gen.tr/esprit.htm
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Within the perspective of this approach, the Court has observed in the
present case that "the constitutive powers basic choice of the political
order surfaces in the first three articles of the Constitution and its
concrete reflections surface in the other articles" and consequently, "the
validity of the legislative organs acts are bound by the constitutional
limitations foreseen by the primary constitutive power."'
146
2. The Irrevocable Provisions Regime as an Extensive Limitation
on Constitutive Power?
Needless to say, this rationale is also widely open to criticism. In
fact, Turkish constitutional history bears witness to constitutive action
taken against such an interpretation. Under the 1961 Constitution, the
initial version of Article 147 bore no limitation on the Courts jurisdiction
in face of constitutional amendments. Combined with the Court's
activism, this extensive jurisdiction naturally resulted with the annulment
of numerous constitutional amendments, limiting the legislature's
attempts to adapt the text to its own policies. In reaction, Article 147 on
the Court's jurisdiction was amended in 1971 with the adoption of Law
No. 1488 which introduced the control of form limitation with regards to
constitutional amendments. However, through the establishment of the
"control ofform in substance" formula illustrated above, the Court was
able to overcome much of the intended jurisdictional limitation. Taking
this into consideration, the drafters of the 1982 Constitution took
measures to further clarify the issue. As a result, Paragraph 2 of Article
148 of the Constitution of 1982 elaborated on the limitation of form,
explicitly stipulating that with regards to the control of constitutional
amendments the Court's jurisdiction would be limited in essence with the
proposal and voting majority of the amendment in question.
Nevertheless, citing its former jurisprudence 147 in the present case
on Law No. 5735 concerning the "Turban Amendment," the Court has
(last visited Apr. 1, 2010) (citing Pierre Wigny, Droit Constitutionnel: principes et droit
positif [Constitutional Law: Principles and Positive Law], Bruxelles, Bruylant (1952), t.I,
p.215) at note 8.
146. Judgment of 5 Jun. 2008, E: 2008/16 K: 2008/116, Anayasa Mahkemesi
[Constitutional Court] (Turkey).
147. Judgment of 4 Apr. 1971, Official Gazette 17.3.1972/14131, E: 1970/41 K:
1971/37, Anayasa Mahkemesi [Constitutional Court] (Turkey); Judgment of 15 Apr.
1975, Official Gazette 26.2.1976/15511, E: 1973/19 K: 1975/87, Anayasa Mahkemesi
[Constitutional Court] (Turkey); Judgment of 23 Mar. 1976, Official Gazette
12.8.1976/15675, E: 1975/167 K: 1976/19, Anayasa Mahkemesi [Constitutional Court]
(Turkey); Judgment of 12 Oct. 1976, Official Gazette 20.1.1977/15825, E: 1976/38 K:
1976/46, Anayasa Mahkemesi [Constitutional Court] (Turkey); Judgment of 27 Jan.
1977, Official Gazette 21.4.1977/15916, E: 1976/43 K: 1977/4, Anayasa Mahkemesi
[Constitutional Court] (Turkey),
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insisted that the control of form foreseen by Article 148 also includes the
inherent form provided by the irrevocable articles regime and that
majority power in the legislative organ does not give this power the
ability to change the fundamental political structure of the state as
understood by the primary constitutive power. 48 Consequently, when
faced with an amendment that might affect laicism, it would look as if
the substance of the proposal, if effectively adopted, could give rise to a
contrary situation vis-A-vis the principles set forth in Articles 1, 2 and 3
of the Constitution. 149 In their dissenting opinions, this fact has been
criticized by Judges Adali and Kilig. I n his dissenting opinion Judge
Kili9 underlined the historical efforts to restrict the Courts jurisdiction
with regards to constitutional amendments in order to demonstrate how
the constitutive powers did not intend for the Court to adopt such an
extensive approach. He observed that the adoption of a strict
interpretation of the irrevocable articles regime, which extends to all the
provisions of the Constitution, not only deducted from the Constitution
the power to answer to problems of future generations, but also removed
the true purpose of the irrevocable articles regime itself.
C. The Substance of the "Turban Amendment" in Light of the Principle
of Laicism
Once the Court had determined its jurisdiction over the proposed
constitutional amendment, it naturally had to question the conformity of
the substance of the proposed amendment with the irrevocable provisions
of the Constitution. If the substance was in conformity with the first
three articles of the Constitution, the amendment could be accepted. The
contrary would give rise to a violation of the form foreseen by Article 4
of the Constitution, rendering it null and void.
148. See Judgment of 5 Jun. 2008, E: 2008/16, K:2008/116 Anayasa Mahkemesi
[Constitutional Court] (Turkey). This stance has naturally given rise to discussion on the
power of judges and Courts, a dilemma that many democratic systems face. Although the
dialectics of the democracy versus 'juristoctracy'/'gouvernement desjuges" debate is not
a new, it seems the balance between the judiciary and other powers of government is
becoming a central theme of discussions in political systems where strong constitutional
courts may be involved in actively shaping the political and legal geography of the
country. It is for this that the theme is increasingly debated by both lawyers and political
scientists. For example see Goldstein's review of some of the literature on the subject.
Leslie F. Goldstein, From Democracy to Juristocracy, 38 LAW & Soc'y REv. 611, 611-
29 (2004).
149. Judgment of 5 Jun. 2008, E: 2008/16 K: 2008/116, Anayasa Mahkemesi
[Constitutional Court] (Turkey) (Hakim Kili J., dissenting).
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1. The "Turban Amendment" as an Attempt to Bypass the Court's
Jurisprudence
According to Law No. 5735, the existing text on the equality on
receiving public services under Article 10 and the right to higher
education under Article 42 would be reinforced. Article 1 of the Law
would insert the phrase "and in all enjoyment of public services" into
Paragraph 4 of Article 10 of the Constitution so that the final version of
Article 10 /4 would read "state organs and administrative authorities
have to act in all their processes and in all enjoyment of public services
according to the principle of equality before law." Article 2 of the Law
foresaw the inclusion of a new Paragraph to Article 42, which would
thus state: "No one shall be deprived from using their right to a higher
education for whatever reason unless clearly stipulated by law. The
limitations on the use of this right are foreseen by law." Although these
amendments contained no clear reference to the issue of the Islamic veil
per se, the foreseen textual changes were on one side presumed to leave
existing prohibitory practices without a constitutional basis, and on the
other side, force the Court to reinterpret its previous stance on the issue.
This clever design was specifically formulated against the Court's
aforementioned jurisprudence of 1989 and 1991. Since no clear legal
provision existed on the use of the Islamic veil in higher education,
higher education authorities would be deprived of legal backing for
circulars that prohibited the use of religious symbols within their
compounds. Moreover, any act of enforcement would be de iure
contrary to Article 10.
Within this perspective, the Court acknowledged that the sedes
materiae of the amendments focused on the prohibition on the use of the
Islamic veil in higher education. As expressed by the Court, "the
primary aim is the recognition of the freedom to cover for religious
reasons to those who enjoy the right to higher education as a public
service. ' 15°  Declarations by political party members throughout the
negotiations within the Constitutional Commission and the General
Assembly pointed out this fact. Moreover, the second paragraph of the
General Justification of Law No. 5735 rendered this situation obvious; as
it stated that "The prevention of the right to training and education of
certain students in higher education establishments due to their clothing
and attire has become a chronic problem" which had prevented "for a
long time, the use of the right of training and education by some female
students because of the clothing they use to cover their heads." These
150. See Judgment of 5 Jun. 2008, E: 2008/16, K:2008/116, Anayasa Mahkemesi
[Constitutional Court] (Turkey).
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were sufficient for the Court to consider the amendment a bypass of its
jurisprudence and an attempt to modify the practice of laicism in Turkey.
However, lacking clear reference to religion in the text, the possibility of
the annulling the Law was still not apparent and would need further
justification from the Court.
2. The Democratic Deficiency Argument
The Court based its primary rationale on the method of the adoption
of the law'51. It acknowledged that the legislation had the prospect of
resolving the deprivation of the right to higher education of some
students, but noted that criticisms brought against the method of the
legislations' adoption had to be also taken into consideration. For the
Court, an approach which did not efface "fears in society" and answer
"to the demands for guarantees;" essentially "excluding democratic
conciliation methods" and "embracing defiance or imposition as a
method" naturally jeopardized major democratic values.1 52 It stated that:
The Constitution does not allow the abuse of religion, religious
feelings and those considered holy by religion as an alternative to
15 1. The amendment was adopted in haste, after a long year of political tension
surrounding the election of the Republic's President. In 2007 the term of the 10"h
President of the Republic, Ahmet Necdet Sezer, had come to an end and the Parliament
was due to elect a new President. The governing Justice and Development Party
nominated Abdullah Gil, the Minister of Foreign Affairs. The laic opposition party, the
Republican People's Party, was against Gi, expressing his former Islamist affiliations
and the fact that his wife wore the Islamic veil as pertinent points of anxiety.
Simultaneously, massive rallies were organized by the laic segments of the society in the
largest cities of Turkey. See, e.g., BBC NEWS, Secular rally targets Turkish PM, Apr. 14,
2007, http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/europe/655485 l.stm. The government insisted with the
nomination and holding a majority, elected Abdullah Gil on the 27 th of April 2007. The
Constitutional Court annulled the election, expressing that the General Assembly meeting
quorum had not been met, since the opposition members had not participated in the
session. Having not been able to elect the president, early national elections were held in
July 2007, in which the right-wing Nationalist Action Party was able to enter into
parliament, consequently augmenting the number of conservative votes represented in
Parliament. Thus in August 2007, the new conservative dominated parliament elected
Abdullah Gill as the 11m President of Turkey without any discussions on the subject.
While the political tensions surrounding the issue were still high on the political agenda,
the amendment concerning the use of the Islamic veil was brought before the parliament
without providing ample time for public debate or providing precautionary measures for
the anxious laic segments of the population. This point has also been remarked by
international observers who have remarked: ". . . the way [the Prime Minister's] party
proposed [the amendment]-abruptly, with little public discussion-angered the secular
old guard and disappointed liberals, who support the changes, but want them to be
accompanied by changes that strengthen other rights, like free speech." Sabrina
Tavernise, Turkey's High Court Overturns Headscarf Rule, N.Y. TIMES, Jun. 6 2008,
available at http://www.nytimes.com/2008/06/06/world/europe/06turkey.html.
152. See Judgment of 5 Jun. 2008, E: 2008/16, K:2008/116, Anayasa Mahkemesi
[Constitutional Court] (Turkey).
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resolving social problems within the framework of the Constitutions
clear provisions through methods based on democratic peace and
conciliation. Since all abuse of social problems dislodges the
possibilities for the problem to be resolved, it may cause the
deepening of social conflicts and the nonfunctioning of democratic
processes; consequently the belief that the state power will resolve
social problems may be damaged.1
53
The Court thus considered the method which the amendment was
brought gave rise to great concern on the principle of democracy
protected by Article 2 of the Constitution. For the Court, this democratic
deficiency was not only limited to the method of the amendments'
adoption, but was also present within the proposed text since it was
lacking of sufficient protection for third party rights.
3. The Third Party Rights Argument
The Court's second argument resided on the protection of third
party rights. According to the Court, in substance the amendment would
not only prevent administrative authorities from placing any kind of
restriction on the enjoyment of the right to higher education, it would
also de-regulate the rules on clothing and attire in higher education,
leaving them without any standard and thus preventing the possibility of
taking measures against religious attire. 154  For the Court, although
religious symbols were the enjoyment of an individual choice and
freedom, this de-regulation comprised the risk of evolving such symbols
into tools of social pressure in places such as laboratories or classrooms
where students of different individual choices and lifestyles were obliged
to work together. 5 5 The proposed amendments would tie the hands of
authorities to such an extent that, even if religious symbols were used for
social pressure, thus perturbing education and public order, it would be
impossible to take measures to resolve conflicts.
156
On this point the amendment did however provide for the possibility
to bring restrictions through law. But as the Court observed, Turkish
constitutional order does not provide any legal measure that can force the
legislature in adopting such a law. This would leave "the adoption of
legal precautions which protect other people's freedoms and the public
order" to the legislature's discretion. Taking into consideration that "the
majority of the country's population adheres to a specific religion," it
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the freedom of religion. For the Court, human rights necessitated the
protection of the fundamental rights and freedoms of third parties,
especially those who did not adhere to the beliefs of the majority and this
protection should be provided directly within the constitutional text,
excluding it from the discretion of political parties.
157
These two arguments, the first concerning the law's adoption
through imposition and in a manner non-compatible with the consensual
standards of democracy, and the second referring to the non elimination
of public fears due to the lack of an effective introduction of legal
safeguards against abuse were sufficient for the Court to express that the
proposed amendments were in violation of the Constitution. The Court
underlined both its own jurisprudence and that of the Council of State,
which expressed that the use of the Islamic veil within higher education
would create pressure on non-Muslims and for non-covered Muslims and
would open the path for the political abuse of religion. 158 In order to
reinforce its position, the Court also cited the pertinent jurisprudence of
the ECHR.159  Consequently, the Court found that the proposed
157. Id. It is possible to criticize the Court's foresight on the future threat of inaction.
One can question the legitimacy of a constitutional court's scrutiny of non materialized
legislation. This naturally raises the question of the Court's political activism, for it is
difficult to understand the legal rationale behind the conclusion reached over legislation
that might or might not be passed in an undetermined future. Although it is true that
under human rights law the state has to take into consideration protective measures
against abuses, such an issue should only arise if in a concrete case the constitutional
norm effectively gives rise to such a situation. Mistrust towards the ability of the
legislature to address such a situation enforces the fears of 'governing judges' and
contradicts with the principle of separation of powers. Such a rationale cannot be
explained through abstract legal discussion, but necessarily contains the political
circumstances surrounding the debate. Then the question simply comes to: should
constitutional judges look into the political aspects of a question or not?
158. See Judgment of 5 June 2008, E: 2008/16, K: 2008/116, Anayasa Mahkemesi
[Constitutional Court] (Turkey).
159. Case of Dahlab v. Switzerland, 2001-V Eur. Ct. H.R. (2001), available at
http://cmiskp.echr.coe.int/tkpl97/search.asp?skin=hudoc-en (select "Decisions" on the
right; search for "Dahlab"; then follow "Dahlab v. Switzerland" hyperlink); Case of
Refah Partisi and others v. Turkey, App. No. 1340/98, 41342/98, 41343/98, 41344/98,
2001-III Eur. Ct. H.R. (2001), available at http://cmiskp.echr.coe.int/tkpl97/
search.asp?skin=hudoc-en (search for "Refah"; then follow "Case of Refah Partisi"
hyperlink); Case of Leyla Sahin v. Turkey, App. No. 44774/98, 2005-XI Eur. Ct. H.R. at
55 (2005), available at http://cmiskp.echr.coe.int/tkpt97/search.asp?skin-hudoc-en
(search for "Leyla"; then follow "Case of Leyla Sahin v. Turkey" hyperlink). We must
point out that the $ahin jurisprudence has been criticized by some authors due to the
extensive interpretation of the margin of appreciation doctrine, thus withdrawing
European supervision from the relation between state and religion. See Karima
Bennoune, Secularism and Human Rights: A Contextual Analysis of Headscarves,
Religious Expression, And Women 's Equality Under International Law, 45 COLUM. J.
TRANSNAT'L L. 367, 381 (2007); Bottoni Rossella, The Origins of Secularism in Turkey,
9 ECCLESIASTIcAL L. J. 176 (2007).
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amendments were in substance directly and indirectly contrary to the
irrevocable principle of laicism. According to the Court's own words:
When the Constitutional Court and the European Court of Human
Rights judgments are observed, the conclusion has been reached that
the provisions brought to articles 10 and 42 of the Constitution; as a
method, the use of religion for political means and in content, the
violation of others rights and giving rise to grounds for the disruption
of public order, are clearly contrary to the principle of laicism.1
6
4. European Jurisprudence as a Supportive Argument
One final important point to remark concerns the continuous
reference by the Court to European jurisprudence within its judgment.
Within this sense, while taking European human rights law as a center
point of reference for the interpretation of the Constitution, the Court
seems to believe that even though the emphasis placed on laicism may
differ, European jurisprudence seems to somewhat agree with the Court's
assessment on the necessity to apply laicism aggressively. The Court
may not be misguided on this assumption. For instance, in the Case of
Leyla 5ahin v. Turkey, the ECHR took the potential of extremist religious
movements heavily into consideration when arriving to the conclusion
that Turkey's interference to the freedom of religion and right to
education could be considered necessary in a democratic society. 16 1 The
ECHR reinstated that "The Court does not lose sight of the fact that there
are extremist political movements in Turkey which seek to impose on
society as a whole their religious symbols and conception of a society
founded on religious precepts."'1 62 These movements had already been
reaffirmed as a threat to democracy in the Case of Refah Partisi and
others v. Turkey in which the Grand Chamber stated that:
The Court must not lose sight of the fact that in the past political
movements based on religious fundamentalism have been able to
seize political power in certain States and have had the opportunity to
set up the model of society which they had in mind. It considers that,
in accordance with the Convention's provisions, each Contracting
160. Judgment of 5 June 2008, E: 2008/16, K: 2008/116, Anayasa Mahkemesi
[Constitutional Court] (Turkey).
161. Case of Leyla Sahin v. Turkey, App. No. 44774/98, 2005-XI Eur. Ct. H.R.
(2005), available at http://cmiskp.echr.coe.int/tkpl197/search.asp?skin=hudoc-en (search
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State may oppose such political movements in the light of its
historical experience.
163
The Grand Chamber arrived at this conclusion through reinstating
an elaborate comparison between Sharia and essential democratic values
stated in the Chamber judgment of the same case according to which:
[S]haria, which faithfully reflects the dogmas and divine rules laid
down by religion, is stable and invariable. Principles such as
pluralism in the political sphere or the constant evolution of public
freedoms have no place in it. . . . It is difficult to declare one's
respect for democracy and human rights while at the same time
supporting a regime based on sharia, which clearly diverges from
Convention values, particularly with regard to its criminal law and
criminal procedure, its rules on the legal status of women and the
way it intervenes in all spheres of private and public life in
accordance with religious precepts.164
Thus, both the Court and the ECHR seem to place the same
significance on the principle of laicism. Moreover, recent judgments
seem to illustrate the fact that not only does the ECHR accept laicism as
an important European value, but it has more and more conceptualized it
within the confines of the Court's original interpretation. For example,
in the Case of Dogru v. France65 and Kervanci v. France66 the ECHR
has emphasized the States "role as the neutral and impartial organizer of
the exercise of various religions, faiths and beliefs," expressing the idea
that "Pluralism and democracy must also be based on dialogue and a
spirit of compromise necessarily entailing various concessions on the
part of individuals which are justified in order to maintain and promote
the ideals and values of a democratic society"; which would allow the
State to "limit the freedom to manifest a religion, for example by
wearing an Islamic headscarf, if the exercise of that freedom clashes with
the aim of protecting the rights and freedoms of others, public order and
public safety." Thus, for the ECHR laicism, neutrality and pluralism-
taken into consideration together-form legitimate grounds for justifying
163. Case of Refah Partisi and others v. Turkey, App. Nos. 41340/98, 41342/98,
41343/98, 41344/98, 2001-1I Eur. Ct. H.R. at 124 (2001).
164. Case of Refah Partisi and others v. Turkey, App. Nos. 41340/98, 41342/98,
41343/98, 41344/98, 2001-11 Eur. Ct. H.R. at 72 (2001), available at
http://cmiskp.echr.coe.int/tkpl97/search.asp?skin=hudoc-en (search for "Refah"; then
follow "Case of Refah Partisi" hyperlink).
165. See Case of Dogru v. France, App. No. 27058/05, Eur. Ct. H.R. 61-67 (2008),
available at http://cmiskp.echr.coe.int/tkpl97/search.asp?skin=hudoc-en (search for
"Dogru"; then follow "Case of Dogru v. France" hyperlink).
166. See Kervanci v. France, App. No. 31645/04, Eur. Ct. H.R. 61-67 (2008),
available in French at http://cmiskp.echr.coe.int/tkp197/search.asp?skin=hudoc-en
(search for "Kervanci"; then follow "Case of Kervanci v. France" hyperlink).
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the refusal of admission for students who insist on using the Islamic veil
to classes;167 a rationale in line with that of the Court.
CONCLUSION
As previously expressed, this paper did not have the ambition of
proposing a watershed solution to the conflict on the use of the Islamic
veil in higher education in Turkey. Such a solution cannot be limited to
the domain of legal analysis and must take into account the numerous
socio-political parameters surrounding the issue. Neither did this paper
aim to discuss the legitimacy of the political and legal initiatives
undertaken by the various actors, nor that of the counter arguments put
forth by the Court. The realization of such an argument essentially
necessitates the formulation of a policy view on the probable resolution
method of the conflict in order for it to be self-consistent, and this cannot
be easily put forth due to aforementioned reasons. Thus, our main aim
from the start has been to try to illustrate, to the extent possible, the
significance afforded to the principle of laicism by the Turkish
constitutional system and the Turkish Constitutional Court through the
demonstration of the legal arguments surrounding the controversial issue
of the use of the Islamic veil in higher education.
However, refraining from entering into the political dialectics on the
issue, one can still discuss the legitimacy of the approach adopted by the
Court in the aforementioned instance from two angles. First of all, there
can be no doubt that in interpreting Article 148 extensively, in
conjunction with the indirect extension of the irrevocable articles regime
to the whole of the constitutional text, it has become possible for the
Court to practice greater and sometimes limitless control over the
legislature; this issue itself is risk inclusive. Under Article 6 of the
Constitution, the Turkish Nation uses its sovereignty within the confines
of the principles set forth by the Constitution, through the competent
authorities, and no state organ may use a state competence which has not
been foreseen directly by the Constitution. Within this perspective, an
attempt by one power to overshadow the other will openly be in violation
of the principle of the separation of powers. However, taking into
account that all powers have the tendency to extend their competence to
167. See also Case of $efika Krse and 93 Oothers v. Turkey, Decision (Inadmissible),
App. No. 26625/02, Eur. Ct. H.R. 24 January (2006), available at
http://cmiskp.echr.coe.int/tkpl 97/search.asp?skin=hudoc-en (select "Decisions"; search
for "Kose and 93"; then follow "Kose and 93 Others v. Turkey" hyperlink)
(Inadmissible). The expansion of the importance placed on laicism, combined with the
margin of appreciation doctrine devised by the ECHR, will definitely grant in the future
greater maneuver capabilities when it comes to regulating religion with regards to States
party to the European Court of Human Rights.
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the largest extent, the fragile balance between them must be kept at all
cost. 168
Secondly, one cannot deny that in a democratic state the use of a
religious symbol by an individual should eventually be seen under the
auspices of the enjoyment of fundamental rights and freedoms, and
religion per se should not be construed as an abstract risk to a
secular/laic democratic state apparatus. Within this perspective, it can be
difficult to see conformity between human rights and the denial of the
right to manifest ones religion and enjoy the right to higher education at
the same time. However, there can also be no doubt that in legal cases,
the concrete circumstances of the case will determine the outcome.
Thus, it will be these concrete circumstances that provide the necessary
information on whether or not an individual has surpassed the boundaries
of recognized rights and freedoms, if the individual has abused them and
consequently damaged the rights and freedoms of others and if the
individual has thus contributed in disturbing public order. If affirmative,
the state is also under the positive obligation of preventing such abuses,
protecting public order and preserving the rights and freedoms of others
so that, as a sine qua non of democracy, pluralism is effectively applied.
In some circumstances the barriers surrounding this dilemma are not so
easy to unfold. Unfortunately, the use of the Islamic veil in higher
education in Turkey is one such situation. On one hand, Turkey as a
founding member of the Council of Europe and a candidate for European
Union membership has the international obligation to respect and
promote the values enshrined in the concepts of human rights and
democracy to the greatest extent. On the other hand, Turkey must also
answer to the needs of the principle of laicism, which as an existential
norm enables it to be the sole country with a majority Muslim population
practicing such values.
Finally, with regards to the Case on Law No. 5735 concerning the
"Turban Amendment," we must remark that any Turkish constitutional
lawyer is well advised that while the Turkish legal construct does not
foresee "precedent" per se, the Constitutional Court as well as other
judiciary bodies have always relied heavily on jurisprudence in
construing legal rationale. The Court has especially used domestic and
168. This is certainly true for all three powers of government and not just the Court.
For example, when the Court announced its decision on the unconstitutionality of Law
No. 5735 on the "Turban Amendment," regrettably, some political actors, to express their
discontent, went as far as implying the legislatures power to close the Court itself if
"national will" necessitated it. These expressions were later used by the Chief Public
Prosecutor's Office in the indictment against the Justice and Development Party.
Needless to say, such rhetoric is inclusive of great risk for both democracy and the rule of
law, two concepts which cannot be sustained one without the other.
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international jurisprudence extensively to arrive at a gradual elaboration
on the interpretation of fundamental constitutional norms so that they
may become applicable in concrete situations. Within this sense, and as
illustrated above, the Court has been extremely active with regards to
those fundamental norms that also form the foundation blocks of the
State's regime. The Court has used these techniques persistently in order
to impede acts that might hurt the State. The control of form in
substance formula is just one example of the scope of this tradition of
extensive interpretation. Besides, albeit allegations on the ultra vires
assumption of authority, the Constitution of 1982 does unfortunately
provide sufficient lack of clarity, both in structure and in normative
regulation, that renders efforts towards refuting the Court's assessments
on its own competence extremely difficult.
It is for this reason that our sincere belief resides in the idea that
sometimes it is more beneficial to leave certain political issues with
unforeseeable social implications out of the domains of legal challenge,
at least until there is enough democratic understanding within the society
on the significance of the issue for all sides. In other words, certain
conflicts that are not resolved within the political and social sphere, may
never be so if transferred into the legal sphere. Courts are under the
obligation of deciding upon the concrete circumstances of the cases that
come before them. In complicated issues in which diverse levels of
political and social concerns juxtapose, thus giving rise to polarized
public opinion, rendering a judgment on the issue might not always de
facto resolve it. This is especially the case when the political question
itself stems directly or indirectly from the interpretation of the
Constitution. Such has been the case with regards to the political and
social conflicts surrounding the use of the Islamic veil in higher
education in Turkey. Although the problem is not legal in essence, when
brought before it, the Court is obliged to apply the law as it interprets it.
This, in conjunction with the divisive and polarizing language adopted
by political actors, have made it much more difficult for there to be an
understanding which might allow the substantial resolution of the
problem; rather than the imposition of one view over another, shifting the
essence of debate to the future. This is why we believe that whether or
not in agreement with the judgment, one cannot blame the Court for
applying its longstanding jurisprudence. Taking into consideration both
the deprivation from the freedom of religion and the right to education
caused by this issue, and the generalized severe social fragmentation, it is
only possible to resolve this decades long conflict through an
unconditional acceptance that democratic dialogue processes between all
relevant actors and a consensual adoption of a pluralistic solution by all
members of the society is a sine qua non.
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